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CONTESTED INSTITUTIONS AND THE LIMITS TO STATE POWER: EARLY COLONIAL 
NATURAL RESOURCE EXTRACTION IN THE CONGO, 1890-1914* 
 
Aldwin Roes 
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 
 
 
In a perceptive critique of the contribution which New Institutional Economics has 
made to our understanding of the economic history of developing nations, Robert 
Bates has argued that the approach, despite claims to the contrary, has suffered from 
an inadequate treatment ± in contrast to the attention paid to rent seeking and the 
reduction of transaction costs ± of politics, social conflict, and power disparities as 
major determinants of institutional design and economic change.1 In the present 
paper, I follow Bates in arguing that the development of economic institutions in early 
colonial Congo (the Etat Indépendant du Congo and its successor, the Belgian Congo, 
prior to the First World War) answered to inherently political rationalities. More 
specifically, I argue that an understanding of the making of the Congolese colonial 
economy requires engagement with the state not just as an arena in which various 
interest groups competed for influence, but as an organization subject to severe 
internal and external constraints and limitations. The fragility of the emerging colonial 
state itself, and its dependence on local collaborators and international capital, should 
play an important part in any explanation of the specific forms under which natural 
resource extraction took place. While it may be justified to emphasize the long-term 
consequences of the coloQLDOVWDWH¶V µFKRLFH¶RILQVWLWXWLRQV, it should not be assumed 
that it possessed either the freedom or capacity to design and enforce an institutional 
framework which best suited its needs.  
 
                                                 
*
 Versions of this paper were presented during 2010 at the workshop on Colonial Exploitation and 
Economic Development, University of Utrecht; and the African Economic History Workshop at the 
LSE, and ± in a cruder form ± DW WKH  LQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\ V\PSRVLXP µ7KH 4XHVW IRU 1atural 
5HVRXUFHVLQ&HQWUDO$IULFDWKH&DVHRIWKH0LQLQJ6HFWRULQWKH'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRIWKH&RQJR¶
at the Royal Museum for Central Africa, Tervuren. 
1
 5REHUW + %DWHV µ6RFLDO GLOHPPDV DQG UDWLRQDO LQGLYLGXDOV DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH 1HZ
InstitutionaOLVP¶LQ-RKQHarriss, Janet Hunter and C. M. Lewis, eds, The New Institutional Economics 
and Third World Development (London: Routledge, 1995), 27- 7R D FHUWDLQ H[WHQW %DWHV¶
pessimistic account is belied by the fact that politics features prominently in several contributions to the 
same volume, notably those by Khan, Clarence-Smith and Booth.  
 2 
There is, of course, nothing novel about the suggestion that the incorporation of the 
Congo basin into international economic networks centered on Europe served political 
goals and was achieved by coercive, political means. The centrality of the colonial 
state, particularly in its coercive capacity, is a constant in the historiography on the 
Congolese colonial political economy.2 This focus on state action finds its origin in 
European conceptions of sovereignty and the pathos of state building characteristic of 
colonial doctrine. The transformative ethos inherent in colonial ideology credited the 
emerging state with the power to create order out of chaos and mould the future 
development of African societies.3 In taking over this transformative project, post-war 
developmentalism also stressed the role the state had to play in guiding its subjects 
towards a brighter future. Marxist and dependency scholars have criticised the 
colonial VWDWH¶V failure to live up to its promise of leading Africans from meagre self-
sufficiency to prosperous interdependence, but they too have tended to attribute a 
central, albeit more negative role to the state in engineeriQJ WKH FRXQWU\¶V
underdevelopment and cementing its subservience to European capital and industry.4 
Due to the comatose state in which the historiography on the political economy of the 
Congo basin under colonial rule has found itself in since the 1980s, state-centred 
narratives, often of a Marxist bent, have not been updated to reflect changed 
circumstances on the ground or research trends in African history over the past three 
decades.5 
 
The study of the organisation of early colonial natural resource extraction is a case in 
point. In the case of wild rubber, the overwhelming historiographical focus has been 
                                                 
2
 Crawford Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994).  
3
 &DSDFLWLHVZKLFKDUHVXPPHGXSLQWKHµ%XOD0DWDUL¶ODEHOZKLFKVWDWHRIILFLDOVenthusiastically self-
applied. See Osumaka Likaka, Naming Colonialism: History and Collective Memory in the Congo, 
1870-1960 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 
4
 Frederick Cooper, 'Africa and the World Economy' African Studies Review 24, 2-3 (1981), 1-86. 
5
 Jean-Luc Vellut, 'Le Zaïre à la Périphérie du Capitalisme: Quelques Perspectives Historiques', 
Enquêtes et Documents d'Histoire Africaine, 1 (1975), 114-51, Bogumil Jewsiewicki, 'Zaire enters the 
World System: its Colonial Incorporation as the Belgian Congo, 1885-1960' in Guy Gran (ed.), Zaire: 
the Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 29-54, Bogumil 
Jewsiewicki, 'Raison d'état ou Raison du Capital: l'Accumulation Primitive au Congo belge', African 
Economic History, 12 (1981), 157-83, Jean-Phillipe Peemans, 'Capital accumulation in the Congo 
under Colonialism: the Role of the State' in Peter Duignan and Lewis Henry Gann (eds.), Colonialism 
in Africa, 1870-1960. The Economics of Colonialism (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 
165-212, Young, The African Colonial State. 
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on organized state violence as a means to maximize output, while more generally the 
narrative has centered on the decisive role the colonial administration played in 
processes of µprimitive accumulation¶.6 Through an engineered deflation of the 
economic carrying capacity of the countryside, so the argument runs, the state 
provided metropolitan capitalist enterprise with the low-wage ultraexploitable labour 
it needed for the profitable exploitation RIWKHFRXQWU\¶V natural produce and mineral 
deposits. Africans were forcefully integrated into the international economy as 
dependent producers of raw materials, while openings for indigenous enterprise and 
capital accumulation were closed off.7  
 
While this account works as a stylized history of long-term trends, it is inadequate as 
a historical explanation. It is largely at odds with the view, now widely accepted, that 
colonial administrations were µramshackle operations¶ whose power was negotiated 
and circumscribed, and fails to take into account the resilience of pre-existing forms 
of social and economic organisation as well as $IULFDQV¶ ability to negotiate changing 
opportunities and constraints.8 Whether the overarching narrative is one of 
modernisation or underdevelopment, colonialism is often depicted as a package deal 
abstracted from real historical choices and unimpeded by African resistance, 
structural constraints or internal contradictions. Crucially, the reduction of Congolese 
colonial history to a direct consequence of the objective interests of a µcolonial EORF¶ 
concedes far more power, efficiency, and foresight to the colonial administration than 
can be historically justified.9 Colonial officials did as much blundering as plundering, 
internal disagreement and muddled thinking led to inconsistent policies and, more 
importantly, the numerous internal and external constraints with which administrators 
                                                 
6
 -HZVLHZLFNLµ5DLVRQG¶(WDW¶ 
7
 These are themes which can be easily taken up in a new institutional economics perspective.  
8
 Bruce J. Berman, 'Review: The Perils of Bula Matari: Constraint and Power in the Colonial State', 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, 31, 3 (1997), 556-70; Frederick Cooper, 'Conflict and 
connection: rethinking colonial African history', American Historical Review, 99, 5 (1994), 1516-45; 
Cooper, 'Africa and the World Economy'. 
9
 Jean-Luc Vellut, 'Hégémonies en Construction - Articulations entre Etat et Entreprises dans le Bloc 
Colonial Belge (1908-1960)', Canadian Journal of African Studies, 16, 2 (1982), 313-30 ; Bruce Fetter, 
L'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, 1920-1940: le Mise en Place d'une Sous-Culture Totalitaire 
(Bruxelles: Cahiers du CEDAF, 1973). 
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were confronted severely limited their power to mould the societies under their care.10 
That such limitations applied with particular force at a time when the state had only 
just started to consilidate its newly won power needs no further elaboration.  
 
That is not to say, of course, that the colonial state was not an important actor in the 
extraction of WKH&RQJR¶Vraw materials. Of course it was. It provided basic security to 
European capital, granted and secured its property rights over conquered land and 
natural resources, created and (unevenly) enforced a recognizable legal framework 
under which it could operate, and intervened actively and often ruthlessly in the 
mobilization of African labour. It is in the field of African labour, which played a 
pivotal role in European civilizing ideologies and, conveniently, also enabled the 
extraction of resources on which the financial viability of colonial rule depended, that 
state intervention was especially active.11 However, while representatives of the 
colonial system were often important players in the social transformations which 
marked WKHUHJLRQ¶VVKRUWFRORQLDOFHQWXU\, the state was not at the centre of all that 
happened within its borders.  
 
This is not a new insight. African historians have a long history of being distrustful of 
state-centred narratives, but this attitude is most often translated into an abandonment 
of WKHVWDWHDVDVXEMHFWRIDQDO\VLV LQIDYRXURIDOWHUQDWLYHPRUHµ$IULFDQ¶XQLWVRI
social organisation such as lineage, kinship or ethnic groups.12 However, claiming that 
the historiographical importance of the state is out of sync with its historical 
significance is itself a historical statement which requires a more direct assessment of 
the extent, nature and limitations of its role in shaping Congolese societies. Ironically, 
the abandonment of the field has left assumptions about the developmental potential 
                                                 
10
 Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment : a Marxist Analysis (London: Macmillan Press, 
1975) and Anne Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism : British policy in West Africa (London ; 
Bloomington, Ind: J. Currey : Indiana University Press, 1989). 
11
 William J. Samarin, The Black Man's Burden. African Colonial Labor on the Congo and Ubangi 
Rivers, 1880-1900 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); David Northrup, Beyond the Bend in the River: 
African Labor in Eastern Zaire, 1865-1940 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 
1988) ; Samuel Henry Nelson, Colonialism in the Congo Basin, 1880-1940 (Athens: Center for 
International Studies. Africa series, 1994); Charles Perrings, Black Mineworkers in Central Africa : 
Industrial Strategies and the Evolution of an African proletariat in the Copperbelt, 1911-41 (London: 
Heinemann Educational, 1979); John Higginson, A Working Class in the making: Belgian Colonial 
Labour Policy and the African Mineworker, 1907-1951 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).  
12
 They have also largely abandoned questions of political economy, to the frustration of A. G. 
Hopkins, 'The New Economic History of Africa', Journal of African History, 50, 2 (2009), 155-177.  
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of the state untested, allowing the persistence of skewed historical memories which 
are distinctly unhelpful in determining future possibilities.  
 
How important was the state in shaping the contours of natural resource extraction in 
early colonial Congo? Inspired by the thought that putting the state in its appropriate 
context requires thinking with as well as beyond it, the state will figure prominently in 
this paper which, through two case studies, offers a very concise overview of the 
exploitation of Congolese natural resources during the first decades of colonial rule. 
Each case study serves to make a different point. The first one, the predatory wave of 
wild rubber extraction, highlights how the structural and financial weakness of the 
Congo Free State (CFS) D µIDLOHG VWDWH¶ LQ LWV RZQ ULJKW contributed to the 
development of a warlord economy displaying the familiar characteristics of local 
militias parasitizing on their environment. My argument here is that the spiralling 
violence associated with the rubber system was as much a consequence of distinct 
weaknesses in the organizational architecture of the state, as it was of colonial 
economic rationality and the legal framework designed by the metropolitan central 
administration and, hence, that a study of economic policy is incomplete without a 
discussion of the former. The second case-study, the development of the Katanga 
copper mining industry and the mobilisation of its labour force, further develops the 
idea that state policies were firmly imbedded in, and constrained by, a series of local, 
regional and international struggles and contexts. State intervention in the extractive 
industries was determined and circumscribed as much by (constructed) political 
necessities as by strictly economic imperatives. In terms of economic implications and 
institutional development, this brief survey presents us with the contradictory 
spectacle of a weak colonial administration disposing of a narrow range of policy 
options heavily impacting upon Congolese societies.  
 
I. 
 
While the exact nature of the link between economics and empire is still hotly 
debated, it seems well established that what Europeans sought in Africa was not so 
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much new export markets as fresh supplies of raw materials.13 While the potential for 
market expansion was a useful argument for binding export manufacturers to the 
colonial cause, $IULFD¶V place in international trade flows remained relatively 
marginal throughout the colonial period even as the continent developed into a major 
exporter of natural resources. This preoccupation was mirrored in a colonial ideology 
proclaiming the natural right of µFLYLOL]HG¶SHRSOHVWRGHYHORSUHVRXUFHVZKLFKZRXOG
be left to lie idle under the management of societies with a lower OHYHO RI µVRFLDO
HIILFLHQF\¶14 Unsurprisingly, when faced with the choice between cheap labour 
policies keeping down the price of raw materials or the encouragement of free labour 
and produce markets increasing African purchasing power, colonial policy makers 
tended to favour the former.15  
 
Even if its ambitions were initially ill-defined, Leopoldian colonialism was an integral 
part of this European scramble for resources. Driven by the desire to obtain the capital 
with which to pursue an autonomous imperial policy for and within Belgium, and 
armed with little more than a selective reading of an obsolete Dutch colonial system 
(characterized by the transfer of surpluses from plantation agriculture to the 
motherland) and the impressionistic information provided by a handful of European 
travellers, the King successfully secured exclusive political and economic rights over 
most of the Congo basin.16 Even though Congolese peoples, in addition to their earlier 
unfortunate role as a reservoir of slave labour for the Atlantic system, were already 
indirectly linked to Europe as exporters of palm products, ivory, copal and some 
rubber, little was known in Europe about the geography or natural resources of the 
region, and even less of this information had trickled down to Leopold and his 
                                                 
13
 6HH 9LQFHQW 9LDHQH 
.LQJ /HRSROG¶V ,PSHULDOLVP DQG WKH 2ULJLQV RI WKH %HOJLDQ &RORQLDO 3DUW\
1860±1905', Journal of Modern History, 80 (2008), 741-90 for a convinving analysis of the political 
and socio-cultural roots of Leopoldian colonialism.  
14
 As in the classic statements by Benjamin Kidd and Frederick Lugard. 
15
 7KHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQORZZDJHSROLFLHVDQGWKHFRORQL]HUV¶GXW\WRLPSURYHWKHPRUDODQGPDWHULDO
wellbeing of their African subjects was felt by some administrators, and was an occasional source of 
conflict. 
16
 Jean Stengers, 'King Leopold's Imperialism' in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the 
Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972), 248-76; Jean Stengers, 'Léopold II et le Modèle 
Colonial Hollandais', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 1 (1977), 46-71. Leopold was of course bound by 
the Berlin Treaty to open his territory to free trade, but the treaty left the door open to other ways in 
which particular economic interests could be favoured.  
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advisors.17 However, limited knowledge was generously compensated by a multitude 
of theories and an equally rich imagery.18 Geologists dreamt up a gold belt extending 
from the Transvaal to the Gold Coast, and explorers talked in glowing terms of the 
region¶s agricultural and mineral potential, at times depicting a veritable promised 
land for white settlement in the process.19 While µvirgin Africa¶ exerted a powerful 
attraction to romantics and speculators exploiting defective information flows, the 
absence of reliable information proved an important and enduring deterrent to large-
scale capital investment.20  
 
Partially due to the legitimate timidity of European investors and entrepreneurs, 
/HRSROG¶VKopes for immediate profits from the export of tropical produce were not 
realized. Despite the intensification and attempted monopolization of the trade in (or 
confiscation of) ivory, the Congo State experienced severe financial difficulties, 
aggravated by undue expansionism and managerial inefficiency.21 From the 1890s 
onwards, state bankruptcy was famously avoided by capitalizing fully on the sudden 
surge in world demand for wild rubber. The forceful extraction of rubber from the 
equatorial forest was the first large-scale mobilization of Congolese labour for market 
production, and the CFS quickly became famous for the violence which accompanied 
                                                 
17
 Roger Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the nineteenth century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 
18
 Jean Stengers, 'Le Katanga et le mirage de l'or' in, Etudes africaines offertes à Henri Brunschwig 
(Paris: 1982), 
19
 E.g. Archives Africaines (AA), Brussels , RF 1713 (Mémoire sur l'Etat Scientifique de la Question 
des Gisements Aurifères Exploitables, 1896) and AA RF 1709, various notes on prospecting. Also see 
Felice Bellotti, Fabulous Congo (London : Andrew Dakers Ltd., 1954) for a late example: µThe 
immense wealth of the Congo is still waiting for the work necessary to exploit it and to place it at the 
GLVSRVDORIWKHKXPDQUDFH>«@7KHUHLVLQWKH&RQJRDSRWHQWLDOMREIRUKXQGUHGVRIWKRXVDQGVRIPHQ
>«@WKHPDUYHORIDJriculture could transform the plains and the jungle into fertile fields, but this needs 
>«@ DUPV KHDUV DQG PLQGV LPSRVVLEOH WR ILQG DPRQJ WKH LQGROHQW VXSHUVWLWLRXV DQG LJQRUDQW QHJUR
race which has halted in time, is opposed to all progress and is fast anchored to a way of life much 
more akin to that of animals than of men¶ ,Q PDQ\ ZD\V $IULFD KDV DOZD\V EHHQ WKH µSRWHQWLDO
FRQWLQHQW¶DZDLWLQJWKHULJKWPRPHQWIRULWVULFKHVWREHXQORFNHG 
20
 Arguably, the speculative element was never completely ostracized from investment in Africa. 
Unsubstantiated optimism could be productive too: investment in the Katanga copper mines and its 
railway links initially relied on grossly unrealistic expectations of potential profit. Also see Jean 
Stengers, 'Le Katanga et le Mirage de l'or' in Etudes africaines offertes à Henri Brunschwig (Paris: 
1982). 
21
 Jean Stengers and Jan Vansina, 'King Leopold's Congo, 1886-1908' in Roland Oliver and G. N. 
Sanderson (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa. Volume 6: from 1870 to 1905 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 315-58.  
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it.22 The Congo Atrocity accusations, directed primarily at a demonic King Leopold, a 
spade-bearded megalomaniac of great cunning but dubious morals, resound until this 
day.23 While the King and his entourage bear undeniable responsibility for the Free 
6WDWH¶V SHUQLFLRXV DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ, historical analysis does not end with the 
identification of villains. As a historical phenomenon, mass violence in the CFS was 
more complex, and understanding it requires a more sophisticated approach to the 
functioning of the state.24 
 
The analysis of Edmund Dene Morel, a prolific writer and active campaigner against 
WKH)UHH6WDWH¶V IRUFHG ODERXUSROLFLHV UHPDLQs influential. 0RUHO¶VZDV D legalistic 
view on the issue: the violence prevailing in the Congo was a direct result of the laws 
decreed in Brussels to satLVI\ WKH .LQJ¶V SHFXQLDU\ concerns. These laws alienated 
large tracts of land from their African occupants and instituted a labour tax by which 
the rubber they contained could be gathered.25 While this may work as a structural 
explanation, it is not a historical one; though charming in its simplicity, it is 
monocausal and Eurocentric. The everyday reality of rubber exploitation was defined 
less by its legal underpinnings than by the methods devised to obtain high levels of 
production. A more searching historical analysis would look at how such plunder 
economies developed locally, which alternative policy options were considered, 
where ideas on labour policy originated, how pressures from Brussels were 
                                                 
22
 Railway construction and porterage services had already serverely impacted the Lower Congo 
District.  
23
 Most famously in Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost. A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism 
in Colonial Africa (London: Macmillan, 1999). Other recent works include Martin Ewans, European 
Atrocity, African Catastrophe. Leopold II, The Congo Free State and its Aftermath. (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); Jean-Luc Vellut (ed.), La Mémoire du Congo: le Temps Colonial (Tervuren: 
Musée royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 2005), and Daniel Vangroenweghe, Voor Rubber en Ivoor. Leopold 
II en de Ophanging van Stokes (Leuven: Van Halewijck, 2005). Reflections on the controversy in 
Belgium can be found in Michel Dumoulin, Leopold II, un Roi Génocidaire? (Bruxelles: Académie 
Royale de Belgique, 2005) and Geert Castryck, 'Whose History is History? Singularities and Dualities 
of the Public Debate on Belgian Colonialism' in Csaba Lévai (ed.), Europe and the World in European 
Historiography CLIOHRES, 2006), 71-88.  
24
 For a more sustained analysis than the one which followsVHH$OGZLQ5RHVµ7RZDUGVDHistory of 
Mass Violence in the Etat Indépendant du Congo, 1885-1908¶South African Historical Journal, 64, 4 
(2010), forthcoming; Jean-Luc Vellut, 'La Violence Armée dans l'Etat Indépendant du Congo. 
Ténèbres et Clartés dans l'Histoire d'un Etat Conquérant', Cultures et Développement, 16, 3 (1984), 
671-707 and Jean-Luc Vellut, 'Réflexions sur la Question de la Violence dans O¶HLVWRLUH GH O¶(WDW
Indépendant du Congo' in P. M Mantuba-Ngoma (ed.), La Nouvelle Histoire du Congo: Mélanges 
Eurafricains Offerts à Frans Bontinck (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004), 269-87. 
25
 Edmund D. Morel, 'The 'Commercial' Aspect of the Congo Question', Journal of the Royal African 
Society, 3, 12 (1904), 430-48 and Edmund D. Morel, Red Rubber. The Story of the Rubber Slave Trade 
Flourishing on the Congo in the Year of Grace 1906 (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906). 
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transmitted and mediated, what structural constraints the taxation of African societies 
presented to state agents, what roles were allocated to (or claimed by) which African 
mediators and collaborators, and what influence such relationships had on the 
development of a brutal system of exploitation. In short, rather than drawing strict 
lines around a unique evil sprawling from the mind of the King of the Belgians, 
thorough historical analysis incorporates features and shortcomings (conceptions of 
the state, scientific racism, modernizing ideologies) which the CFS shared with other 
colonial regimes as well as the crucial importance of local societies and dynamics, 
some of which were related to, but not controlled by, the colonial regime.26 
 
While these arguments cannot be fully developed here, it is worth sharing some of the 
elements which such an approach throws up:  
1. Since his priorities were never in Africa, but in Belgium, Leopold was both 
reluctant to tie up long-term capital in the Congo and determined to obtain 
quick and sizeable returns. The resulting capital shortage heavily affected the 
organization and functioning of the colonial administration: as well as inciting 
a continuous rush for the collection of easy revenue, it significantly weakened 
the fabric of the state. The loose network of posts backed up by mobile 
military columns was grossly inadequate for the routinized exercise of state 
power, central support and control functions were reduced to a minimum, 
communications remained poor and state officials and armed forces were 
inadequately provisioned, often leading them to fend for themselves. The state 
thus fragmented into a number of semi-autonomous plunder economies, with 
officials who were forced into a parasitic relation with their environment, 
scrambling for the food, labour and revenues they required.  
2. The weakness of the state was also related to the structural characteristics of 
the African societies over which it established its sovereignty. While 
Congolese societies were both dynamic and diverse, their largely subsistence 
                                                 
26
 Morel defined the problem in such a way that it excluded criticism of British colonial policy. See 
Kevin Grant, A Civilized Savagery. Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884-1926 (New York: 
Routledge, 2005); Bernard Porter, Critics of empire : British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in 
Africa, 1895-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1968); Frederick Cooper, 'From Free Labor to Family 
Allowances: Labor and African society in Colonial Discourse', American Ethnologist, 16, 4 (1989), 
745-65. The position that the CFS owed its uniqueness to Leopold is echoed in Jean Stengers, 'The 
Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo before 1914' in Lewis Henry Gann and Peter Duignan (eds.), 
Colonialism in Africa (1870-1960) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 261-92.  
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based economies simply did not generate the surpluses required to support a 
strong state apparatus. To the paucity of taxable trade was added the difficulty 
of obtaining labour from societies which were not structurally compelled to 
provide it.27 As African workers were able to flee, migrate or retreat into 
subsistence production, they could be difficult to control and discipline, thus 
complicating the regular employment of wage labour. Confronted with the 
same difficulties, a new breed of African rulers had discovered that the 
possibilities for surplus accumulation through slave-raiding and plundering 
were often greater than those of directly organizing economic production. 
Similarly, the limited arsenal of disciplinary methods which its inability to 
establish direct control over the movements and activities of its African 
subjects OHIW DW WKH VWDWH¶V GLVSRVDO goes some way towards explaining the 
reversion to terror tactics in the extraction of revenues.28 
3. The exercise of state power relied heavily on the assistance of African rulers 
which were formally incorporated into the colonial system as chefs indigènes. 
Cultural affinities as well as a preference for centralised political systems 
tended to predispose colonial administrators in favour of that new kind of 
political ruler, such as the Songye ruler Lumpungu, whose ascent to power 
was closely associated with the extension of the slave frontier.29 While these 
chiefs could mediate the incorporation of their subjects into the colonial order, 
they also used their privileged position to shift the burden of colonial tax and 
labour demands to slaves and subjected peoples, thus further deepening 
tensions and conflict within and between African societies.  
4. African intermediaries not only mattered to the physical exercise of state 
power, but also made up the channels through which information on the 
region, its peoples, their practices and suitable methods of administration was 
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gathered. The prevalence of Zanzibaris and Afro-Arabs among these culture 
brokers facilitated the pernicious process of borrowing, extending and 
adapting the economic organisation of the Eastern slave frontier for the benefit 
of the CFS. The racism displayed by these Islamized µWangwana¶ towards the 
SDJDQ µWashenzi¶ resonated well with European racial conceptions, 
facilitating processes of dehumanization which enabled the commitment of 
extreme and sometimes sadistic acts of violence.30 The adoption and extension 
of the Afro-Arab µVHQWU\ V\VWHP¶ involving the stationing of armed state 
auxiliaries inside village communities, frequently led to usurpation or erosion 
of chiefly power and the further fragmentation of political units, rendering the 
exercise of state power by indirect means more difficult on the long term. 
 
Other limits to European intervention also merit attention. While WKHVWDWH¶Vexactions 
did undermine African reproduction, there was no direct intervention in the vast field 
of subsistence production, no real separation of African cultivators from their land, no 
generalization of private property rights or capitalist transformation of agriculture. 
The state-capital combine, it turns out, was too weak to realize a total social and 
economic transformation of Congolese societies and would later shy away from the 
task altogether. Below the surface of self-legitimising discourses stressing the creative 
force of the state over the structural constraints under which it operated, a strong 
current of continuity in African forms of social and economic organisation can be 
observed.31 The CFS¶V UHDFK DQG LPSDFW ZDV also highly uneven, weighing most 
heavily on the Lower Congo and some of the more accessible rubber districts. 
 
Be that as it may, the suffering engendered by the ruthless exploitation of wild rubber 
was only part of a widespread wave of violence and hardship accompanying the 
colonial shock.32 Due to a combination of factors, the demographic effect of the first 
decades of colonial rule was nothing short of devastating and the territory found itself 
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drained of manpower and resources without much meaningful compensation. This 
crisis could all too easily be explained away as an unfortunate but inevitable 
transitionary phase associated with the incorporation of previously isolated societies 
into the international capitalist system.33 Such abstractions are not very helpful. While 
the dynamics of the CFS can usefully be conceived as processes of µcreative 
destruction¶, exactly what was being destroyed and what was created in its place very 
much resulted from a multitude of concrete decisions which cannot be grasped in a 
tradition-modernity dichotomy.34 
 
II. 
 
Partially due to the financial success of rubber harvesting, mineral prospecting ± 
which really meant tapping into native knowledge ± had scarcely begun in earnest by 
the early Twentieth Century.35 The sparsity of geographical information gathered by 
white administrators during the first decades of colonial rule is in itself revealing of 
the limits to their control over Congolese economic life. The colouring in of the 
geological map of the Congo really started in earnest in 1902, when reports from 
British prospectors in Katanga confirmed the presence of some gold and vast reserves 
of copper there.36 The readiness of British businessmen to invest their capital in the 
development of these resources did much to stimulate the interest of the Congo State 
authorities in the location and exploitation of mineral deposits.37 Over the next two 
decades state as well as private prospecting parties located the majority of mineral 
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deposits around which a more stable export economy would be built during the 
remainder of the colonial period.38 
 
The transformation from a plunder economy towards one in which substantial 
investments were made in mining and plantation agriculture took several years to 
materialize. At first, the British mining financier Robert Williams had experienced 
considerable difficulties in convincing the Free State government that it would be 
worth their while to facilitate investment in the mining sector.39 In part, this hesitancy 
can be explained by the tension between such capital intensive development and the 
monopolizing tendencies of Leopoldian colonialism. Following a familiar pattern, 
Leopold had wished the state itself WRORFDWHDQGH[SORLWWKHFRXQWU\¶VPLQHUDOwealth, 
for example suggesting at one point that some of the richest Katangan copper mines 
should be transferred to the Domaine de la Courronne in recognition of his sovereign 
rights.40 ,WZDVXSWRWKH.LQJ¶V advisors to explain that the long maturation period of 
mining investment conflicted with the meagre resources at tKHVWDWH¶VGLVSRVDODVZHOO
DV/HRSROG¶Vown unwillingness to tie up his capital. As the financial groups on which 
the unlocking of WKH &RQJR¶V mineral wealth inevitably depended insisted on 
considerable autonomy and security, the state had to satisfy itself with a (still 
sizeable) share in profits while its economic role shifted from direct exploitation to 
the facilitation of capitalist enterprise without direct interference in corporate 
management.41 
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%HVLGHV FKDQJHV LQ WKH VWDWH¶V UHODWLRQ WR FDSLWDO the shift to mining and plantation 
agriculture also led to changes in strategies of labour mobilization and control. 
Mining development and the construction of railways necessitated the raising of 
considerable funds on European capital markets and the regular servicing of debts. 
Company solvency therefore depended on more precise economic planning, reliable 
calculations, and predictable production rates ± goals which would remain elusive 
without direct supervision of the production process and stricter control over African 
labour. In a capital-intensive mining industry labour shortages, large scale desertion, 
low worker productivity DQG WKH KLJK GHJUHH RI µODERXU ZDVWDJH¶ WKURXJK GHDWK
accidents and disease inevitably became matters of concern to mining bosses and 
colonial officials. In the remainder of this paper, I will briefly discuss the imperfect 
and changing ways in which Europeans sought to deal with such issues before the 
First World War, paying particular attention to the limits to state power, the 
constraints of its external environment and the absence of a unitary vision on African 
labour within the colonial construct.  
 
For practical as well as ideological reasons wage labour was preferred over forced 
labour for most mining and construction work. As African ZRUNHUVZHUHQRWµIUHH¶LQ
the Marxist sense of being freed from the means of production, their labour remained 
embedded within a system of constraints forcing their regular participation in the cash 
economy.42 Direct and indirect compulsion persisted after Belgian annexation of the 
Free State, but was mostly externalized from the colonial system proper. Labour 
legislation instead focused on the relation between employer and employee, and the 
modalities of the contract which bound them together. This focus on temporary and 
freely enacted contracts enabled officials to see themselves as neutral arbiters 
equitably enforcing the observation of contractual obligations by Africans and mining 
bosses alike while the locus of coercion shifted to African societies themselves. 
Labour recruiters and state officials provided strong incentives to new or old µnative 
chiefs¶ to ensure a supply of workers commensurate with demand, while failure to do 
so was construed as an act of opposition to the colonial state which justified military 
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repression.43 $V$IULFDQUXOHUV¶DOWHUQDWLYHPHDQVRILQFRPHZHUHRIWHQXQGHUPLQHG
sustaining their wealth and power increasingly depended on their services to the 
colonial state.44 However, by maintaining that in mobilizing labour chiefs relied on 
their µWUDGLWLRQDO¶DXWKRULW\the state could excuse itself from scrutinizing their use of 
direct and indirect coercion. As a result, official sources contain very little 
information on this vast area of African labour mobilization.  
 
Yet, it is clear that the reliance on chiefly power signficantly influenced the market 
for African labour in terms both of the kind of worker available for employment (in 
terms of gender, physical properties, ethnicity, age, skills and social status) and of the 
duration and modalities of their engagement in European centres of employment. 
While from the commencement of mining development onwards important voices 
within the administration and business establishment argued for the long-term 
engagement of African workers, the recruitment of married men accompanied by their 
families, and even the encouragement of their permanent settlement (or self-
stabilization) near the mines, a migrancy model characterized by short-term contracts 
and the re-integration of workers into rural society was ultimately forced upon them 
by chiefs such as Lumpungu who refused to organise an outflux of their subjects 
without sufficient guarantees as to their re-integration under their authority.45 In the 
important case of .DWDQJD¶V 1RUWKHUQ Rhodesian workers, similar demands by the 
Rhodesian administration keen to protect its tax base only reinforced this pattern.46  
 
Chiefs were not the only Africans who decisively shaped the emerging mining labour 
market. Although hardly visible in the colonial archives, an unknown but sizeable 
number of Africans took advantage of the high labour demands of, and severe 
competition between, European employers to carve out an existence as casual 
labourers. For a brief period, these men and women enjoyed a strong bargaining 
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position in an emerging economic sector structurally short of manpower, giving them 
the necessary economic independence to resist re-integration into the village 
community while also avoiding onerous long-term contracts. More important still 
were the number of African cultivators who responded to the stimulus provided by 
expanding urban markets by intensifying food production. The extent to which 
Africans were willing and able to enter the cash economy in order to acquire an 
expanding range of consumer goods and/or increase their economic independence, 
and the relative importance of the countervailing breaks which native institutions and 
ruling elites put on such participation, remain regrettably understudied. However, 
given the importance of AfricDQ SUHIHUHQFHV LQ VKDSLQJ WKH FRQWRXUV RI .DWDQJD¶s 
labour market D KLVWRULRJUDSK\ ZKLFK IRFXVHV RQ WKH VWDWH¶V UHJXODWRU\ IUDPHZRUN
alone is inadequate in dealing with .DWDQJD¶V changing economic landscape. 
 
<HW &RQJR¶V colonial historians have unwittingly downplayed the importance of 
African agency by, again, attributing too much creative power to the colonial 
system.47 The active role played by the state in breaking open rural communities 
through targeted taxation and, where possible and expedient, the closing off of 
markets for their agricultural produce is indeed crucial to understanding the early 
ODERXUPRELOL]DWLRQ IRU WKHFRXQWU\¶VFRSSHUPLQHV48 However, while state officials 
were keen to push Africans into the cash economy, they were not in a position to fully 
control the conditions under which this occurred, nor were they sure how, and to what 
extent, this participation should be managed and regulated. Drawing on the 
historiography and experience of migrant labour in the South African and Rhodesian 
JROGPLQHV LW LVFRPPRQO\DUJXHGWKDW WKHPLQLQJLQGXVWU\¶VV\VWHPDWLF UHFRXUVHWR
short-term migratory labour was consciously engineered to ensure maximal 
profitability. In this context, much is made of the monopolization of the labour market 
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by the Bourse du Travail du Katanga (BTK), the semi-official recruitment agency 
FKDUJHGZLWKRUJDQL]LQJODERXUUHFUXLWPHQWIRUWKHUHJLRQ¶VLQGXVWULDOFHQWUHVZKLFK
in practice failed to supply more than a small percentage of paid African workers in 
the region.49  
 
In addition to over-emphasizing the importance of state agency in shaping the 
contours of the Katanga labour market, this historiography unduly homogenizes and 
rationalizes state policy by ascribing the colonial hierarchy with a unity of purpose 
which it rarely possessed. Overall, concrete economic decision-making was 
determined less by long-term strategic goals than by a variety of short-term pressures 
and perceived necessities. Official views on labour policy were not static: direct state 
intervention in WKH%7.¶Vrecruitment effort, for example, was only grudgingly agreed 
to from 1913 onwards, when alternative options had closed down. Rather than 
harmoniously pursuing the labour policy which mining interests desired, state policy 
developed in constant tension with mining development. In the early years of 
.DWDQJD¶V exploration, development and alluvial gold and tin mining, the Comité 
6SpFLDOGX.DWDQJDWKHUHJLRQ¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDXWKRULW\was yet to be convinced of 
the desirability of paying African labour in currency, insisting instead on payment in 
cloth which had limited appeal to African recruits.50 Direct recruitment by the Comité 
Spécial du Katanga was briefly tried, but without the heavy-handedness characteristic 
of CFS rule elsewhere and with limited success.51 In an attempt to break decisively 
with the Leopoldian legacy, the early years of Belgian colonial rule (1909-1912) saw 
a conscious retreat of the state from such direct economic interference. State support 
to the newly founded BTK was strictly limited and based on the idea that this 
Brussels-based organization would prove easier to influence and control than the 
independent labour contractors which so far dominated the labour market. Underlying 
this liberal attitude was a naïve confidence that Africans would readily recognize the 
µmoral and material benefits¶ to be derived from their employment in a µFLYLOL]HG¶
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working environment.52 Indeed, if there was a long-term objective which animated the 
colonial administration in 1910, it was the creation of the necessary conditions under 
which the forces of supply and demand would naturally satisfy the labour 
requirements of the mining sector. By the time the First World War broke out the goal 
was not only not achieved, but also largely abandoned.53  
 
The stark contrast between WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V URV\ SLFWXUH RI µFLYLOL]HG¶
employment and the appalling conditions actually prevailing at the mines and 
compounds goes a long way in explaining the %7.¶Vfailures in attracting sufficient 
labour.54 However, drawing on their personal experience and close contacts within the 
Rhodesian and South African gold mining industry, .DWDQJD¶V mining bosses more 
commonly shifted the blame to innate African laziness and undue administrative 
leniency. Interestingly, adding to the continuing agitation from the Congo Reform 
Association, a new critique of Belgian colonial government was growing in these 
circles which lamented that, as a result of the misguided efforts of British µGR-
JRRGHUV¶, Katanga was now being administered by a weak and ineffective 
government, far too lenient in its treatment of Africans, and therefore inappropriate to 
their current level of civilization.55  
 
Such criticism should remind us that Belgian colonial legislation and administrative 
practice did not develop in isolation. In devising solutions WR .DWDQJD¶V ODERXU
difficulties, the administration drew heavily on the expertise and mental models of 
mining bosses with strong connections to the South African and Rhodesian mining 
industries. International business networks, in particular the group of companies 
centered on the mining consultancy firm of Robert Williams & Company, played an 
important role in transmitting information, procedures and ideas between the different 
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sites in which they operated.56 With IHZ PRGLILFDWLRQV WKH JURXS¶V µe[SHUWLVH¶ on 
African labour recruitment and organization travelled together with its capital and 
personel from the Kimberley diamond fields via the Rand and Southern Rhodesia to 
its new heartland in Katanga. The administratLRQ¶V recognition of the relevance of 
South African expertise WR.DWDQJD¶VPLQLQJGHYHORSPHQW coupled with the superior 
manpower and sizeable financial stake which the Williams group held in the early 
development of its copper mining industry go a long way in accounting for the ODWWHU¶V
influence over an embattled administration which, as yet, had few sources of 
independent advice to draw upon.57  
 
Nonetheless, the shift to direct state intervention on the South African model involved 
more than a convergence of the mental horizons of business and state elites. A 
geopolitical element was also important. With little Congolese labour forthcoming, 
and building on recruitment patterns established during the years of British 
prospecting in the region, the vast majority of workers in the Katanga mining industry 
were Rhodesian in origin.58 The continuing dependency on Rhodesian labour and 
goodwill was perceived as a potential source of instability and a threat to national 
sovereignty.59 It was far from clear if, or for how long, calls by Southern Rhodesian 
farmers and mining bosses for exclusive access to Northern Rhodesian labour would 
be resisted.60 The possible impact of a ban on Rhodesian recruitment was painfully 
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demonstrated in 1907, when the outbreak of sleeping sickness led to the temporary 
closure of the border.61 Even if this closure was often circumvented, and its impact 
thus somewhat compensated by uncontrolled African migration and resettlement to 
Congolese territory (in itself a significant reminder of the limited reach of state 
power), the potential disruption which could be caused by sudden labour shortages 
became a leading concern of mining bosses ever since.62 This concern was translated 
into constant pressure on government to more actively support recruitment and extend 
its control over the Congolese population, and in the meantime also led to attempts at 
obtaining a more diverse and secure supply of foreign workers. Recruitment 
experiments in Angola and Mozambique, however, met with disastrous results ± 
disastrous to the BTK, but especially to the recruits themselves, who died in vast 
numbers.63  
 
One option explored with surprising tenacity was the utilization of large numbers of 
Asian (Chinese or Indian) indentured labour. From its beginnings in 1904 onwards, 
the Chinese labour question in South Africa in particular was foremost on the minds 
of the British directors and local management of Robert Williams & Company, the 
firm in charge of the technical works and labour organization of the Katanga copper 
mines.64 Even before the large scale immigration of Asian workers became practically 
feasible, such indentured labour was presented as the only real alternative to forcing 
unwilling Africans to take up mining work.65 Convinced of the superior efficiency of 
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Chinese workers, tKH8QLRQ0LQLqUH¶VBelgian directors were equally interested, and 
were also able to draw on their important business and political connections in China 
to organize the recruitment and transport operations.66 Moreover, Belgian and British 
businessmen in Tsientsin (Tianjin) and South Africa who had been actively involved 
in organizing the Chinese labour migration to the Rand found themselves out of 
employment when, in 1910, the South African government was forced to abandon 
Chinese recruitment following fierce opposition from white workers and British 
humanitarians.67 These men readily offered their services and expertise, allowing for 
the swift development of a fairly detailed settlement plan, starting with the speedy 
engagement of 2,000 workers on a three year indenture. A press campaign was 
mounted to gather political support in China, political contacts were put to use, plans 
for the construction of compounds were drawn up, the issue of Chinese food was 
discussed, and transit arrangements and transport rates were agreed with the 
Rhodesian railways. In an effort to counter objections to the possible influence of 
&KLQHVH µPRUDO WXUSLWXGH¶ RQ .DWDQJD¶V $IULFDQ SRSXODWLRQ Whe influential Belgian 
missionary Vincent Lebbe, who was based in Tianjin after extensive missionary 
experience in its rural hinterland, devised a plan by which entire communities of 
Christian converts, with chaplains, would be temporarily relocated to Katanga.  
 
As a consequence of their conception of a unified colonial system, KataQJD¶VODERXU
historians have largely ignored or dismissed these schemes, maintaining that their 
ultimate non-implementation was the predictable outcome of a simple cost/benefit 
analysis of Chinese indentured labour.68 Upon closer inspection, however, mining 
bosses and sections within the colonial administration never abandoned the idea 
completely. As late as 1914, the Department of Economic Affairs at the colonial 
ministry in Brussels was still supplying its minister with fresh arguments in favour of 
the scheme. Objections to Chinese immigration had little to do with the profitability 
of mining, but were based on geopolitical, moral and international considerations. 
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2SSRVLWLRQ FDPH IURP .DWDQJD¶V ORFDO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ DQG LWV 9LFH-Governor Emile 
Wangermée, from the Department of Foreign Affairs and from Belgian diplomatic 
circles.69 It was argued that Asian indentured labour constituted a departure from the 
µHWKLFDO FRORQLDOLVP¶E\ ZKLFK WKH %HOJLDQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQKDGEHHQ WU\LQJ WR HIIDFH
the Leopoldian legacy, opening the door to renewed humanitarian agitation and 
diplomatic complications. Principles aside, it was therefore considered practical 
politics to at least await British official recognition of BelgiXP¶V sovereignty over the 
Congo, after which point the country would find itself in a much stronger position to 
resist foreign objections.70  
 
What finally decided the fate of the Chinese labour scheme, however, was a 
combination of political change in China and Belgian fears of South African 
expansionism. The Chinese revolution of 1911 altered the power relations between 
Western governments and the Chinese state. The new republican government, while 
not opposed to the settlement of its subjects in Katanga, strongly insisted on the 
dignified treatment of its people and refused to accept the restrictive conditions, 
modelled on the South African precedent, under which labour recruitment was 
proposed to take place.71 While the importation of Chinese labour may still have 
presented cost benefits to the mining industry, the degree of control to which these 
immigrants could be subjected was now strictly circumscribed. Crucially, Chinese 
objections to forced repatriation clauses presented a real danger that indentured labour 
would herald the beginning of a permanent and possibly preponderant Chinese 
presence in Katanga. As it was widely believed that a free Asian population would 
economically outcompete potential Belgian colonists, the issue took on serious 
security and geopolitical dimensions: driven by the conviction that Belgian 
demographic ascendancy was the only real safeguard to the threat which South 
African expansionism in particular SUHVHQWHG WR WKH&RQJR¶V WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\, the 
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colonial administration had made Belgian settlement of the region one of its first 
priorities.72 If Katanga were to remain Belgian, the Chinese had to be kept out. 
 
Despite its abandonment, the importance of the Chinese labour question transcends its 
value as a historical anecdote. Fears within the local administration that the Chinese 
settlement scheme would gather sufficient support in Brussels to be carried through 
despite its opposition, led it to a reassess its role in the mobilization of African labour. 
Under pressure to present a viable alternative, the administration stepped up its 
support to the BTK, extended tax collection and co-ordinated its perception with the 
%RXUVH¶V UHFUXLWPHQW. 5HPDUNDEO\ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V
population density also changed: in contrast to earlier pessimism, reports sent to 
Brussels now UHJXODUO\ DOOXGHG WR WKH µGLVFRYHU\¶ Rf new concentrations of African 
population able to provide the necessary labour. Mining bosses had pressed the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ IRU \HDUV WR H[WHQG LWV FRQWURO RYHU .DWDQJD¶V UXUDO KLQWHUODQGV WR
verify their labour potential, and bring their populations firmly under control to 
facilitate labour recruitment, discourage desertion and enforce the execution of the 
AfricanV¶ part of their labour contracts. As Chinese labour had been so convincingly 
presented as a viable alternative to the intense exploitation of Africans, the 
administration now had to accept the reverse as being equally true: to safeguard the 
mining industry without recourse to Chinese labour required much stricter control 
over Africans. The closing of the Chinese option and the increased pressure on the 
Congolese population were two sides of the same process.  
 
Unlike the structuralist versions which have preceded it, this reading of the 
development of .DWDQJD¶V labour policy recognizes that history meanders, changes 
course, and is ultimately open-ended. However, against the background of the above 
shifts in state policy and perception, it is fitting to stress some of the continuities 
which may be more difficult to perceive when relying solely on state records. (1) 
Rhodesian labour continued to be dominant roughly until the take-off of copper 
mining in Northern Rhodesia in the 1920s.73 Throughout this period, the majority of 
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.DWDQJD¶V PLQHworkers were mobilized without recourse to the Belgian colonial 
apparatus, relying instead on recruitment and enforcement in British territory. 
Therefore, the study of actual patterns of labour mobilization, rather than labour 
policy, needs to leave Katanga behind and shift its focus to dynamics across the 
border. (2) Below the colonial radar, and also without WKHVWDWH¶V intervention, a group 
of Africans had entered the colonial economy on its own terms. While the colonial 
apparatus was blundering its way towards a satisfactory solution of the labour 
problem, construction and production continued with the aid of this elusive and ill-
studied group of semi- and self-stabilized workers ZKRHQJDJHGZLWK.DWDQJD¶VPDQ\
labour contractors.74 While their contracts were at least as short DVWKRVHRIWKH%7.¶V
recruits, they often did not return to their village of origin when these were completed, 
but took advantage of their strong bargaining position to find more lucrative 
employment in the emerging cities and mining centres. Acknowledging the 
importance of these workers, whose independent spirit was distrusted by the 
administration and whose wage demands were resented by employers, also influences 
our perception of the stabilization policies which the Union Minière inaugurated in 
the 1920s: these did not merely mark the transition from a migratory to a stable, long-
term labour force, but also cut those who had stabilized themselves out of the most 
lucrative and desirable jobs.75  
 
III. 
 
The above case studies each serve to illustrate a different point. The spiralling 
violence of the rubber regime shows an administration which was extremely 
disruptive despite, or because of, being weak. The obvious implication is that state 
weakness does not equal its insignificance: shortcomings in the fabric of the state 
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were directly related to the culture of violence which surrounded the ruthless 
exploitation of wild rubber, causing widespread disruption and a severe demographic 
crisis which rendered the subsequent exercise of political power more difficult. State 
influence on the development of the Katanga copper mining industry was initially 
more limited: the dynamics driving the establishment and growth of the Katanga 
mining industry and the mobilisation of its labour force largely escaped the 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vcontrol. The availability of British capital and expertise was tied to 
the changing fortunes of the Southern African regional economy, African chiefs 
imposed short-term labour contracts, workers were largely recruited beyond the 
VWDWH¶V ERXQGDULHV DQG PDQ\ WRRN DGYDQWDJH RI WKHLU VWURQJ bargaining position as 
casual labourers to enter the mining economy on their own terms. Without direct state 
intervention, however, the labour market, marked by worker indiscipline and wage 
inflation, did not conform to the wishes of mining bosses.  
 
The institutional framework set up in support of the copper mining industry did not 
flow directly from the structural imperatives of expatriate capital, but was the 
imperfect outcome of a slow and meandering historical process. If, by 1913, the 
colonial administration did not see any alternatives to a South African migrancy 
model supported by direct state intervention, this reflected the failure of earlier 
Belgian liberalization, the closing off of the Chinese option, the need to accommodate 
African elites, geopROLWLFDOLPSHUDWLYHVWKHSHUFHSWLRQWKDWWKH80+.ZDVµWRRELJWR
IDLO¶DQG WKHSUHSRQGHUDQWKROG6RXWK$IULFDQDQG5KRGHVLDQ precedent had on the 
FRORQLDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VSROLWLFDO LPDJLQDWLRQThe solution to the LQGXVWU\¶V labour 
problem was not merely considered in its technical or strictly economic aspects, it was 
equally determined by political necessities, and internal and external constraints.  
 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the use of state power in shaping the Katanga 
mining labour market lies in its limitations. While administrators liked to think of 
themselves as the even-handed enforcers of freely enacted labour contracts, they were 
rarely if ever able to play this role. The fundamental difficulty was that the state 
lacked to power, or will, to create the circumstances under which Africans would 
freely render their services to European employers. Crucially, it did not actively 
enforce health regulations or legal stipulations on acceptable living and working 
conditions, nor did it put a stop to Europeans¶XELTXLWRXVuse of physical violence as a 
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means of maintaining labour discipline. Instead, state officials embraced the 
HPSOR\HUV¶YLHZthat African reluctance to engage in the mining industry was mainly 
attributable to their inert laziness, lack of wants and continued economic 
independence, of their not been µIUHHG¶ from the means of production. The result was 
a rather one-sided system of pressures and controls, which stifled African initiative 
and tended to block rather than support the growth of peasant agriculture or self-
stabilized African worker communities.  
 
This paper, then, makes three points which have relevance for the role of the state in 
African economic history beyond its own specific geographical and chronologic 
limitations: (1) the state needs to be decentred and contextualised. This entails 
analysing the structure of the colonial system and the tensions within it, looking at the 
mutual interaction between its components and their relation to other sub- and 
supranational actors and developments, and examining the structural constraints to 
which the state was subjected as well as the available knowledge which determined 
how these constraints were perceived, (2) what historians can contribute to social 
analysis is a focus on process rather than structure, and a realization that social 
change does not originate in functional or structural imperatives but in very real 
everyday struggles over power and access to resources, and (3) we need to move 
away from an overly voluntaristicµFUHDWLRQLVW¶FRQFHSWLRQRIZKDWWKHVWDWHGLGDQG
can do. The state was never free to do just as it pleased, society did not just follow its 
lead, and its actions usually had consequences officials did not foresee. The colonial 
state was not as much a force which decisively propelled society forwards, as an arena 
in which outside pressures were assessed and mediated based through specific mental 
models. Its importance lies in the creative process of responding to such constraints.  
